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The Tanzania economy in 1984-85 behaved like a person who has been struggling
in quicksand for what seems an eternity. One foot had reached hard ground and
a few shaky tentative steps on the long journey to safety taken. On the other
hand the tide of import constraints and shortages still threatened to rise
further and suffocate it. These ambivalent characteristics were summed up in
Finance Minister Msuya’s measured, determined but hopeful Budget Speech1 and
2in the reaction to iu* ”Budp3et of cautious optimism” versus "Little to
3impress the IMF” (not that it appeared designed to do the latter).
In 1984 for the first time since 1979 or 1980 Gross Domestic Product in
constant prices appears to have risen (the dubious initial 1983 increase
announced having apparently been corrected to a decline). ' True, the figures
by sector appear somewhat shaky but the key one - a 2 . 5 % increase in
agriculture is backed by reduced need for food imports over 1984-85 and by
data on export crops. 0 True too, 2.6$ is below the 2.8-3.2$ probable true
7population growth rate and leaves constant price output per capita some 
1 7i%—20% below 19 7 8 and national purchasing power (adjusted for terms of trade 
losses down by at least 30-35$ per capita. However, 1983 did mark a reduced 
rate of decline and 1984 a slight turnaround.
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Squally crucial, 1984-85 seems likely to be the first year of generally good 
crop weather since 1977-78. Only the Lake region (Mwanza-Shinyanga-Mara) 
still seem to have been in the grip of drought or badly distributed rainfall.
OFood imports are expected to decline further - indeed to levels suggesting 
maize self sufficiency. Perhaps more critical, retail prices of food actually 
declined - against the normal seasonal trend - early in 1 9 8 5  ^as merchants and 
hoarders reassessed the supply situation and trend. A continuation of this 
pattern could have major positive effects not only on nutrition but also on 
morale and especially on urban morale which has been much worse hit over
1981-84 as real urban incomes plummeted both absolutely and relative to rural.
The 1984/85 Budget outturn was also positive in two senses: recurrent revenue 
sharply exceeded targets and the recurrent deficit covered by bank borrowing 
was both 2 0$ lower than targeted and down 30$ in real terms (marginally in 
nominal terms) on 1983/84.^  Similarly domestic credit formation remained 
around 15$ (half of inflation) indicating continuation of the highly 
restrictive monetary policy begun in 1 9 8 1.
Imports - the clear choke on capacity operation and rehabilitation - rose
11.2$ in nominal terms to $981 million in 1984 reversing a steady decline 
11since 1979. Of this perhaps one third represented price increases, one 
third "no forex" imports of consumer goods and one third general import 
expansion. How the imports were financed is less than clear - exports did not 
rise nor did payments arrears (now semi stable at a revised estimate of 
$360-400 million for about a year).
* *■
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But Continued Weakness
On the negative side, the most serious result was the stubborn failure of
exports to rise. At $402 million they were 3* down on 1983's $413 and almost
1230* on 1979’s $564. As in 1981 when a previous export drive raised volume 
increases (much more modest than in 1981 but welcome after severe 1982 and
1983 falls) offset by price falls. Unfortunately, the latter (and 
fortunately, the former) seem likely to be continued in 1985. As a result of 
continued export unsuccess and borrowing to maintain even sub-essential import 
levels, external debt service (excluding arrears reduction) has climbed to
$240 million for 1984 ($262 million projected 1985) from $89 million in
131980. As a direct result the 1984/85 estimate of $925 million operating and
maintenance, $280 million investment imports and $260 million debt service -
$1,450-1,500 total - required for normal operation and maintenance of existing
capacity, restructuring to increase exports and modest productive capacity
increases is under one third covered by present or immediately projectable
14imports. Minister Msuya's Budget Speech and President Nyerere's May
15economic address both stressed increased export earnings as vital to 
sustained recovery.
1984 brought no breakthrough on raising external finance for structual 
adjustment and 1985 prospects are none too good. A IMF programme - seen as a 
precondition for major new programmes by several sources (including the World 
Bank and the UK) - seemed no nearer in mid-1985 than in mid-1 9 8 1 . Even more 
seriously projections of external accounts through the early 1 9 9 0's suggested 
that major IMF drawings over 1985-87 followed by repayment over 1988-92 would 
prevent, not facilitate, external balance recovery given IMF interest rates 
and repayment periods.
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Inflation - as measured by the cost of living index - rose to 36? for 1984
measured on annual averages and 38? on fourth quarter to fourth quarter 
17comparisons. While not surprising given the 40? odd increase in the cost of 
foreign exchange and of grower prices in 30? in wages, the result is 
unsatisfactory especially in view of the restrictive monetary and tighter 
fiscal policy carried out in 1984/85. Food price stabilisation in the first 
half of 1985 may result in reduced inflation - giving room for badly needed 
foreign exchange rate and wage adjustments but as of mid-year the situation 
was unclear.
Manufacturing output declined again by 13? in 1984 taking real output down to
1 8under half 19 78 levels and to under 5? of total domestic output versus 
nearly 10? at its late 1970’s peak. Until this decline can be reversed the 
chances for increased goods availability to choke off price increases, provide 
genuinely real incentives for peasant producers and reduce input bottlenecks 
to agricultural production and construction are negligible.
Agricultural policy remained basically inconsistent and in many respects
19unsound. The 1984 for 1985 price increases averaged 40? nominally to offset
inflation and the removal of input subsidies. However, in the absence of any
real prospects of increased consumer manufactured goods or agricultural input
supplies, these increases are at present the strongest inflationary engine in
the economy - ironically all the more so for officially purchased crops given
increased output with a return of good weather. Initial 1985/86 price
20announcements suggest a 25? average which may do something to damp down 
inflation - especially if there is good weather in 1985/86 which would largely 
eliminate the parallel market in grain and hold price increases for the wide 
array of food products not officially purchased at nil to very low levels.
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Similarly the reintroduction of regional co-operatives, restructuring of 
primary societies and switching of functions from Crop Authorities (restyled 
Marketing Boards) to co-op unions has arguably been the most botched of all 
Tanzanian agriculture institution shifts. As a result total marketing costs 
seem likely to increase up to a third in real terms between 1984 and 1986 
unless the working party headed by Minister of State, A. H. Jamal, can define 
and secure enforcement of controls over co-op budgets and cuts in Marketing 
Board overheads and personnel; measures clear to meet strong co-op, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Marketing Board resistance. Already the slippage has 
resulted in a Sh.500 million 1984/85 marketing body deficit contravening clear 
1984 directives.^
Finally, the 1985/86 Budget is complete only on the fiscal and perhaps the 
export incentive side. On these it is positive - continuing austerity, 
holding out some promise of a real cut in the recurrent deficit (as revenue is 
very cautiously estimated and all key expenditure items seem plausibly
ppestimated, unlike transfers to local government in the 1984/85 Budget ) and 
reordering export and import rules in a way likely to increase recorded - and 
perhaps discourage smuggled - exports.
However, three key issues are not covered, i.e. postponed:
a. wage increases to limit the ongoing one third annual erosion of 
real wages from price increases;
b. retail grain price increases to offset the 1984 for 1985 grower 
price increases which came into force in July;
c. exchange rate adjustments to prevent re-emergence of large deficits 
on crop exports (probably to Sh.24 or 25 to the dollar). I~~;
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Deferral of the second and third is expensive because the deficits will pile 
up until these changes are made and cannot be reversed unless higher increases 
than those which would have been necessary in June are made subsequently. 
Similarly the food and forex price increases cannot possibly be made without a 
parallel, at least partly offsetting wage change. Unfortunately with the 
passing of the normal Budget timing of such changes, deferral until after the 
election seems likely - a lag likely to entail severe inflationary and public 
sector deficit costs and to threaten the continuation of the deflationary 
credit policy of 1981-84.
Thus 1985-86 prospects are clouded and ambiguous - although that is in itself 
a distinct improvement on the mid-year prospects of the past four years. The 
key questions will be whether:
a. import expansion can be sustained and used to increase domestic 
manufactured goods production;
b. exports can be raised in dollar value (not just quantity) terms;
c. price changes deferred in the 19 8 5 / 8 6 budget are made in time and
degree adequate to avoid retrogression on the fiscal and monetary
fronts and continued over 30? inflation;
d. the 1984/85 agricultural output increase is at least 5% extending
across export as well as food crops and 1985/86 is an average or
better year in terms of weather (and pests/diseases);
e. progress can be made on longer term export rebuilding and 
restructuring - e.g. the Kilamco fertiliser complex, a Bank 
Structural Adjustment Programme or its equivalent, a major increase 
in bilateral structural/rehabilitation finance.
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Positive answers to a majority of these questions would mean 4 to 5% real 
growth in 1986 (and perhaps 1985) and illuminate a possible, if still 
difficult and slow, road to recovery. Negative answers to all or almost all 
would lead to a return to the 1 9 7 9 - 8 3 downward spiral from a much worse 
initial position.
Liberalisation, Incentives, Efficiency, Equity
Over 1984-85 a series of campaigns were continued, initiated or turned into 
ongoing programmes in continued efforts to divert resources back into legal 
channels, curb profiteering and increase incentives for official exports and 
return flows of imports.
24The anti-economic sabotage campaign was concluded as such in 1984 with 
future cases to be handled by the normal court system. A total of 4,363 
arrests were made over 1983-84. Of 3,685 cases disposed of by the end of 
1984, 863 resulted in convictions by Tribunals or other judicial bodies, 385
in Tribunal acquittals, 741 in police and 1,086 in Regional Committee
25discharges. Total seizures of currency and property via official
2 6procedures seem to have been of the order of $5 million. The convictions 
and seizures do indicate a serious effort - the number of releases and 
acquittals an independent and careful judicial process.
However, as a means to reducing prices of shifting production and sales to 
open channels the campaign was not a success. Shortages were - and are - too 
great for a greater chance of arrest to wipe out illegal trading. Indeed 
1983-84 illegal price movements suggest that the effect of greater risk was to 
raise, not lower, prices. The effect on parastatal employeee honesty - or at
any rate circumspection - is harder to assess. Lower diverted flows of goods 
may help account for the higher prices.
The main purposes of the campaign were moral and political - to reaffirm state 
concern about probity and opposition to profiteering/corruption and to attack 
what was - and is - widely hated as an exploitative social evil. The latter 
factor probably explains why the the large scale, long distance parallel grain 
market did not feature prominently in the campaign - high parallel market 
grain prices in the context of drought are not seen as being of the same
degree of evil as import/export/currency profiteering.
Whether the return to the normal court system will mark an end to economic 
sabotage emphasis or be coupled with higher police - Attorney General’s -
magistracy concentration on these offences is unclear. The basic problem has
never been lack of laws nor has it been judicial and prosecutorial corruption. 
It has been fourfold: lack of competent prosecutors (and their concentration
on cases involving violence in committing crimes); police concentration on 
violent crime and lack of expertise on economic offence cases; an overloaded 
court system and a reluctance of the magistracy to take non-violent economic 
offences very seriously. Whether the campaign will lead to lasting 
reprioritisation of resources within the first three constraints and a 
recognition by the judiciary that economic sabotage - espeically on external 
trade and currency linked cases - threatens national economic security is
unclear.
In the second half of 1984 an attempt was begun to encourage the return of
illicit trade - especially smuggled imports - into open channels. Several 
27steps were taken:
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a. allowing certain goods (in practice basic and semi-amenity consumer 
goods) to be imported fairly easily if no foreign exchange had to 
be remitted from Tanzania;
b. waiving price controls in respect to such imports;
c. raising customs duties on imported consumer goods.
By early 1985 on the order of $30 million of imports had been brought in under 
these provisions. Supplies of amenity and semi-amenity goods (including soap 
and cooking oil) were more (or at least more visibly) available and at prices 
below 1984 illegal market peaks. Customs collections rose sharply. However, 
several problems emerged:
a. markups from tax paid import cost to retail seemed to range from
400$ to 700$ (and by no means always totally declared for income
tax purposes);
b. virtually no production inputs were imported - even by firms who 
had idle production capacity but used the no forex import facility 
to bring in finished consumer goods;
c. the import and price decontrol provisions in effect legalised one 
side of a previously wholly illegal smuggled export/smuggled import 
circuit and by so doing made smuggled exports (to get forex for no 
forex imports) more attractive absolutely and relative to 
legitimate ones;
d. consumers and commentators saw the price increases as legalised
rip-offs - "Well, you can bring the stuff. Repeat you can bring
2 8the stuff and proceed to rip us off, Okay". as one columinist put 
it;
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e. both commentators and - in private - reputable businessmen warned
that no forex imports were in fact almost totally financed by
smuggled exports not by genuine repatriation of assets held abroad.
These results posed a dilemma for the government. The public did welcome the 
added availability of some goods and the pressure on a few domestic prices 
they led to even if many items were beyond the pockets of most of them. 3ut 
they also resented the apparent legalisation of profiteering and the suspected 
increase in export smuggling. The government on reflection was appalled at 
the disincentive it had given to official secondary exports and realised that 
their precipitate 1979-84 decline might well relate to increased smuggling, 
and decreased incentives for officially recorded exports, more than to actual 
production declines. Further, the $40-50 million a year apparent flow level 
of no forex imports suggested a much higher level of export smuggling than 
previously estimated.
30As a result in MayJ , President Nyerere announced changes which were detailed
31in the subsequent Budget:
a. all reputable firms and individuals would be licensed to handle 
non-traditional exports;
b. the exporter could keep 50$ of the proceeds in forex available for 
imports;
c. these could include consumer goods of specified types as well as 
production inputs and spares for his own or other businesses.
The results remain to be seen. The evident purpose is to make legal exporting 
more attractive and de^ facto to create a limited "auction” window for import 
licenses financed by the additional official exports with exporters selling
29
imports to whatever consumers or producers feel a particularly urgent need to 
procure them without waiting for them to flow through official channels.
Socialism: Retreat Or Regrouping?
A series of critiques of the public sector by President Nyerere in April and 
MayJ  ^ were variously interpreted as recanting on socialism, redefining 
public/private sector boundaries and seeking to increase public sector 
efficiency by cutting back demands on its limited resources and/or getting it 
out of small businesses not praticable to operate well on a centralised basis.
The first interpretation is hardly consonant with Mwalimu’s intentions - nor 
with what a majority of the CCM Central Committee would endorse. Nor would it 
be popular - frustration with public sector weaknesses and/or corruption in 
Tanzania is basically because it is preceived that the public sector could do 
better, indeed that it did over most of 1967-78. Similarly while small 
businessmen are not viewed as class enemies nor large businesses which are 
seen to pay and charge fairly condemned for being private or mixed, relative 
equality of incomes is widely seen as important and both profiteering 
businessmen and corrupt public sector collaborators are widely and deeply 
hated. At a mass response level the President is leaning against the wind in 
arguing that the public sector is too large and that cutbacks in its scope as 
well as improvements in its internal efficiency are needed.
In fact both Tanzania’s reputation for being anti-private business and the 
degree of current changes are underestimated and the commitment by many 
leaders (including the President who once said, when speaking of the public 
sector, that for a socialist in a poor country waste was a mortal sin) to 
efficiency in terms of avoiding waste of resources. Except for brief populist
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outbursts - never fully representing state policy - private business has never 
been discouraged as such and since 1976 has clearly been encouraged. Since 
1980 $300 million odd of private foreign equity investment has indeed been 
attracted - almost all unfortunately to oil exploration which has not struck 
oil to date - while the largest single economic project pursued doggedly since 
1980 is the $500 million export oriented natural gas/fertiliser project which 
has always been conceived as a joint venture.
The public sector cutbacks concentrated on:
a. small business not suitable for large enterprises - e.g.
’denationalisation* of municipal butchers in the 1 9 7 0*s;
b. shifts from centralised to decentralised (e.g. co-op primary
society) activity partly to increase flexibility and reduce costs 
(a hope not bauxed by evidence of probable attainment) but also to 
increase peasant power;
c. opening avenues for medium scale savings to be invested in areas
either not priorities for state funding allocations or not
threatening to public sector economic leadership - most notably the 
33May 1985 da facto repeal of the ban on medium and large scale 
private property rental except for government, party and public 
enterprise leaders;
d. selling off very badly run public enterprise units - notably the
34worst run down sisal estates - albeit sometimes with little
regard for the causes of their problems, e.g. in this case a
horrible economic environment leading to private sector output
falling as fast as public and a horrendously weak (by Tanzanian
public sector standards) management from 1974 to date.
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These in fact do not add up to any abandonment of public economic sector 
leadership albeit they are intended to encourage private sector activity in 
areas seen either as peripheral but not undesirable (e.g. middle and upper 
income housing), important but beyond present public sector capacity (e.g. 
abut a third of public sector sisal estates) or suitable only for small scale 
enterprises (by definition private, co-op or village).
The efficiency thrust has been centred on specific institutional reforms, on 
shifting crop marketing to smaller and (hopefully) more participatory bodies, 
and on general reviews of possible state and public enterprise cost savings 
headed by Minister of State, A. H. Jamal. The latter seem to have
identified about 8% overemployment (27,000 of 350,000 odd) in government and 
somewhat more (perhaps 10Í of 200,000) in public enterprises. Assuming equal 
potential savings on other items (e.g. economising on transport, reducing 
material wastage and spoilage) this suggests total potential efficiency gains 
of Sh.1,500 million.
Unfortunately, these gains - which are not such as to suggest massive, easily
remedied inefficency of more than say Sh.250-500 million (1-2Í of government
and parastatal turnover) - will be hard to achieve. Managers, workers and
parent ministries (notably Agriculture) of weaker parastatals clearly are
opposing them.^ Initial government past reductions seem likely to be limited 
77to 1 2 , 0 0 0 albeit reducing replacement hiring could provide an additional 
reduction of 3-5 , 0 0 0 annually without actual firings.
Part of the problem is Tanzania’s traditional reluctance to fire except for 
serious improper action or total incompetence. Senior officials and managers 
responsible for nonfeasance or misjudgement - as opposed to gross malfeasance
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- tend to be transferred or given another chance (by no means always 
successfully, the 1973-74 NMC debacle was presided over by the same general 
manager as the 1970-72 STC debacle), a tolerance which does not encourage 
workers councils and the trade union to go along with lower level
o o
retrenchments even when they accept in principle that they are needed.^
1985*3 Currency Exchange
At the end of July Tanzania suddenly recalled the Sh.100 note (nearly 90% of 
value of note circulation). Notes could be exchanged up to Sh.10,000 and 
balances above deposited in bank accounts useable for normal transactions but 
subject to government inspection (e.g. by tax officers).^ The apparent 
purposes are:
a. to trap Tanzania notes illegally held abroad (which may in fact not 
be considerable);
b. to open legal - but profiteering - trading to tax surveillance;
c. to raise the costs and difficulties of illegal (or illegal 
export/legal import) business.
How effective the exercise will be remains to be seen. At a cost, note
holders can readily hire people to change for them (as happened on a huge
scale in a somewhat comparable Uganda exercise). The result of tax inspection
will raise costs of operations and may either cause reductions in their scale
40or price boosts to cover the new costs - not as some commentators suggessted
halt them altogether. They will reduce the advantage of illegal versus legal
exporting but will also relative to totally illegal operations. The
41interpretation as a reversal of liberalisation is either untrue - it is a 
logical part of making legal export/import business subject to income tax more 
attractive relative to the no forex import route - or misreads the
* * «
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liberalisation which was always seen as an efficiency oriented, bottleneck 
reducing tactic within a public sector led economy not a reversion to 
capitalism in any general sense.
Progress on increasing efficiency of the worst functioning sector
agricultural marketing - has been limited. While Crop Authorities assertedly
42saved over Sh.600 million by cost cutting exercises in 1984-85, they adopted 
(without the required Treasury approval) budgets allowing 25-55% unit cost 
increases and ran up Sh.500 million in unplanned deficits^ despite clear 
instructions to operate at breakeven or better.
Problems Of Co-op Restructuring
The Co-operative restructuring (primary society) and reestablishment (regional 
unions, national union, co-op bank) gathered spee^ over 1984-85 with several 
regional unions beginning full operation but also appeared remarkably ill 
thought out and executed given the two years lead time since the decision to 
reestablish in 1981-82. A series of problems have arisen:
a. whether to encourage 3ingle village primary societies or revert to 
multi village ones - a straight Party, old co-op management fight 
with peasants in most regions (not Arusha, Kilimanjaro or parts of 
Kagera and Mwanza) on the single village side but on occasion 
coerced into multi village units;
b. how to choose co-op union and national staff - again a Party, old 
co-op management battle largely won by the latter with limited 
reference either to peasant wishes or the logic of transferring 
competent Crop Authority staff to the unions;
c. semi multi vs single channel marketing, i.e. primary society 
freedom to sell to Regional Trading Companies, processors and
* *
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institutional buyers - especially in their own regions - and to 
handle short distance transport (an approach favoured by several 
economic ministries and - presumably - primary societies) vs 
requiring primary societies to sell only to unions and the latter 
to Marketing Boards (backed by Agriculture and the union 
managements);
d. cost control since the interim structure of state setting of grower 
prices with primary societies and unions then setting their own 
charges subject to nominal approval by an understaffed and 
non-financial section of the PM’s office followed by a similar self 
serving exercise by Marketing Boards rubber-stamped by Agriculture 
seems a sure recipe for higher marketing costs leading to higher 
consumer prices, tax payer subsidies to export Boards and/or 
recurrence of marketing body and debts (of which about Sh.5,000 
million had been transferred to the Treasury in 1981 and 1984 to 
clear out the past backlog and provide a base for enforcing 
financial discipline - with some success in National Milling over
1982-84).
While a working group under Minister Jamal was set up to try to sort out the 
financial issues and the President intervened against imposition of 
multi-village co-ops, the whole exercise remains problematic in results. It 
seems as likely to increase costs as to control them, to substitute (recreate) 
co-op management dominance over peasants for Crop Authority control as to 
increase participatory processes and to harden one channel marketing 
inefficiencies as to reduce them.
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In general the consolidation of research and extension in agriculture has 
failed to yield substantial results to date (either on better services or 
lower costs). Mor have other problems been significantly overcome beyond
Agriculture's reverting from a 1976-80 policy (under Marketing Development 
Bureau technocratic 'expertise') of holding down export crop prices to one of 
urging maximum grower price increases whatever the inflationary consequences 
and with little attention to real (inputs, transport, prompt payment, 
applicable extension advice) obstacles to output increases. Presumably as a 
result, 1985 saw a change in Principal Secretary with the veteran
administrator, Ernest Mulokozi, brought back from Ambassador to Brussels to 
the Ministry.
Price Policy: Reform To Hiatus
1984/85 price policy falls intc twc halves - an active pursuit of reduced
distortions in 1984 and a postponement of decisions in 1985. In 1984 a
devaluaton of nearly 3 0% was made to achieve - at least in intent - breakeven
on agricultural exports, agricultural price increases were keyed to expected
inflation and the cost to growers of ending input subsidies, large wage and
smaller salary increases were made to offset (at least in large part) expected
44inflation including ending the last food subsidy, that on maize meal. While 
these measures did contribute to raising the rate of inlation, they also
reduced price distortions and, especially, the producer/consumer subsidy 
burden on the Treasury thus strengthening fiscal and monetary policy.
In 1985 the budget dodged wages and exchange rates as well as basic food
prices. This may have been in part general election year unwillingness to 
take unpopular decisions. However, it also reflects the continued negative 
influence of IMF demands for large inital devaluations. The Treasury is known
' r *
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to want small devaluations to adjust for excess inflation and maintain a rate 
consistent with breaking even of export crop trade while providing incentives 
to growers - a rate which in mid-1985 would have been Sh.24 or 25 to the 
USA$.^ Once output recovery (and good weather) reduced inflationary pressure
it wanted phased adjustment to a rate comparable in price adjusted terms to
1979, probably about Sh.35 as of mid-1985. The IMF demanded a 3h.35 rate at 
once and a Sh.50 rate (to offset the massive increase in inflation and 
adjustment to Sh.35 at one leap would cause) by December.^ The combination 
of Treasury attempts to negotiate a viable rate change pattern and of 
opposition to any rate change in reaction to the IMF’s demand for a huge one 
seem once again to have prevented any action as has been true repeatedly from 
mid-1 9 8 1.
The experience of Uganda where large initial changes have led not to stability 
but to a 99% devaluatoin (Sh.7 to over Sh.600 to the $) over 1981/85 has 
hardly encouraged a plunge in the dark. Similarly Zambia’s experience with 
prolonged use of IMF credit which has led to a quarter of its export earnings 
now being mortgaged to service past high interest, short maturity IMF drawings 
has given rise to doubts that a large iMF drawing - as opposed to a small one 
to seal an agreement and encourage other softer, longer term financial flows - 
would be prudent. On this too the IMF apparently disagrees - surprisingly 
given the incompatibility o f 9%, 6 year borrowing with Tanzania’s external
balance prospects and its problems with its large scale, long continued 
lending in SSA where at least Sudan, Zambia and Liberia are in de facto
default totalling about $200 million on total outstandings of about $1 , 0 0 0  
million (vs Tanzania’s nearly current position with less than $50 million
remaining to be repaid).
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What price decisions were taken at or around budget time were cautious - 20 to
4725Í increases on sugar and some export crop producer prices for 1985-86 and
4 8an increase in depositor and lender interest rates. The former is, in part, 
an anti-inflationary gamble on continued good weather and the latter a mildly 
inflationary step unlikely either to increase savings or redirect lending 
substantially but equally unlikely to do much harm. The dominant 1985 change 
in price trends may be in food where the improved weather should limit
increases in products with dispersed marketing (e.g. cooking bananas, 
potatoes, fruit, vegetables, eggs, livestock) and sharply reduce the gap 
between official and parallel prices for maize and - less certainly - rice.
Debt And External Balance Considerations
Both as Tanzania's President and as OAU Chairman, President Nyerere has laid
heavy stress in 1985 or the weight of Africa's external debt burden. The fact
that it is the heaviest of any region relative to output and exports, that it
cannot be paid on time and that for many countries there is a real choice of
de facto default or starvation because debt service and food import bills
cannnot both be met, bulked large in speeches on his farewell visits to 
49Europe ’ and his calls for an OAU Summit concentrating on economic affairs
(the first normal Summit to do so since the 1980 Lagos Economic Summit was a
special meeting). His argument has not been that African states wish to or
should default but that they can pay only if more time, softer terms and more
new assistance to sustain and restructure production are provided. These
terms appear prominently in the 1985 OAU "Addis Ababa Declaration" as does the
call he has made for a joint conference of African states and major creditors
50to discuss ways and means of achieving rescheduling and refinancing.
*
The basic external balance position worsened in 1984. Exports fell 3% to $402
t |  p
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million - probably about a 5$ price fall offsetting a 2$ quantity increase. ^ 1 
With 1984/85 export crop production up 44$ for sisal, 6$ for coffee, 8$ for 
cotton, 28$ for tobacco, 43$ for pyrethrum, 27$ for tea and 3% for cashew 
nuts, 1985 physical exports should be at least 10$ up over 1984 but price 
changes could well wipe out the gain at foreign exchange earning level.
The 1984 import level of $981 million - still well below the $1,250 million 
52estimate for relatively full maintenance and operation of the existing 
economy and achievement of adequate investment to raise productive capacity 5$ 
a year - is well above twice export proceeds. Adding debt service of over
$240 million (probably not all met) gives a total of $1 , 2 2 0 million. 
Subtracting net invisible earnings of $100 million maximum plus gross loan and 
grant inflows of perhaps $500 million leaves over $200 million unaccounted for 
and raises doubts as to whether 1984*3 import levels are sustainable.
Export incentives received central attention in the Budget (albeit not the
54Development Budget or Annual Plan). They centred on:
a. retention - in the form of import authorisation - of varying 
percentages from 10 to 50 of foreign exchange proceeds (highest for 
non-traditional and somewhat less for main crops and for 
manufactures);
b. continued attempts to build up semi-balanced trade and credit 
(countertrade) agreements with other Southern and Eastern African 
states under SADCC and PTA umbrellas;
c. incentives to local sales for foreign currency (e.g. to aid 
contracts, duty free shops, visiting ships);
d. strengthening tourism (in conjunction with external partners 
including Ismaeli financial institutions) and small scale mining.
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Two major related developments were the (late) commissioning^ of the pulp and
paper mill at Sao Hill which should generate up to 30,000 tonnes of exports
and $30 million of foreign exchange earnings when its 60,000 initial capacity
is reached and progress toward completion of engineering and financial
arrangements for the Kilamco natural gas to ammonia and urea project which
should within three years of completion yield over $1 0 0 million in net foreign
56exchange earnings as well as in tax revenues plus parastatal profits.
Transport and infrastructure rehabilitation and operation made some progress
in 1984/85. Finance for rehabilitation and improvement of Dar es Salaam
57harbour and of Tazara were largely secured. Less clear progress was made in
58respect to the Tazama oil pipeline to Zambia and Tanzania Railways. EEC’s
59veh:.cle rehabilitation project was extended and expanded. Both Tazara and 
Tanzania Airways turned in their first ever annual operating profits for 
1984. o0 TANESC0 made progress on extending the national grid, completed 
engineering and financing requirements for its next main hydro unit and firmed 
up its financial base by a 50$ rate increase.^
Budgetary Outturn Progress And Projection Potential
62The 1985/86 Recurrent Budget estimates total Sh.23,360 million up from 
Sh.18,119 million 1984/85 estimates and Sh.20,674 million estimated actuals. 
The 1556 increase on 1984/85 estimated actuals is less than the general rate of 
inflation but, in the absence of a wage increase (which presumably would 
necessitate tax measures) may be attainable. This is especially true because 
the 1984/85 increase of Sh.2,500 million odd over estimates came 60$ from 
underestimates of the transfers needed to local government (Sh.2,447 million 
versus Sh.972 million budgeted), a mistake apparently not repeated in 1985/86
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where Sh.3,500 million odd has been budgeted. In addition contingency at over 
Sh.2,000 million is above 1984/85 levels despite the presumptive absence of a 
wage increase element in the 19 8 5 / 8 6 figures.
Recurrent revenue for 1985/86 is estimated (after tax changes) at Sh.19,912 
million - vastly up on the 1984/85 estimate of Sh. 15,028 million but much only 
marginally up on the Sh.18,000 estimated actual especially since it includes 
Sh.1,292 million in net new tax revenue. This would appear to give room - as 
in 1984/85 for collections well in excess of estimates. Therefore the 
recurrent deficit/bank borrowing requirement of Sh.3,448 million may well be 
overestimated and a nominal as well as a larger real reduction on 1 984/85’s 
Sh.2,674 million (itself down in real and nominal terms on the 1983/84 actual 
and 1984/85 estimates) is possible.
Tax measures involve modest cigarette, soft drink, spirits and beer increases 
in specific duties (actually by less than inflation), a highway road toll (in 
the case of Dar routes collected by a surcharge on fuel tax), a number of 
simplifications and incentives involving reductions in some indirect taxes and 
in direct tax on co-ops and partnerships and a payroll levy (half offset by 
abolishing the 1974 Workers and Peasants Housing Levy while continuing use of 
the over Sh.1,000 million collected as a revolving fund). The abolition of 
the production development funds which since 1974 earmarked some tax revenue 
for capital expenditure in specific industries will also boost recurrent 
revenue albeit eliminating an equal source of finance for financing capital 
spending.
The 1985/86 Development (capital) Budget J estimates are Sh.6,828 million 
about the same as 1984/85’s Sh.6,560 million estimate but below the estimated
4 *  *
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actual of Sh.7,383 million. Like the Recurrent Budget it represents a 
proposed decrease in constant price expenditure. Financing is proposed at 
Sh.3,426 million ($200 million) external grants and loans, Sh.1,650 non-bank 
domestic borrowing and Sh.1,752 million bank borrowing. This would imply 
Sh.5,200 million total bank borrowing, the same nominal amount as 1984/85 
estimates but 30$ up on estimated actuals of Sh.4,000 million. However, as 
noted there is some reason to expect performance to be better than estimates 
again in this respect. The estimate is for a total bank borrowing equal to 
17$ of expenditure vs an estimate of 2 1 $ in 1984/95 (actual bank borrowing 15$ 
of expenditure).^
The annual plan for 1985/86^ - apparently in practice virtually limited to 
government and parastatal capital spending - totals Sh.16,187 million. Of 
this Sh. 8,571 million is to come from public enterprise net cash flow, local 
government own revenue, domestic financial institution borrowing and external 
loans and joint venture equity. While nominally the first tranche of a 
1985/86 - 1989/90 5 Year Plan, the Annual Plan was not presented in the
context of forward projections nor contain much policy or analysis except at 
very general level. The contrast between the two budget speeches was equally 
stark - Minister Msuya's concentrating on specific analysis linked to related 
policy measures and Minister of State, Kighoma Malima's a mix of very general 
- almost academic - analysis with specific capital budget financial data.^
Zanzibar - Cloves and Merchants
Zanzibar's economy ran down later than that of the rest of Tanzania partly 
because it bore no substantial share of the cost of the war following Amin's 
invasion, partly because clove export prices followed a different pattern than 
those of mainland exports, partly because its government budget is in practice
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heavily subsidised by mainland Tanzania and partly because in the 1970’s it 
built up very large foreign exchange reserves held separately from those of 
the Union. However, since 1982 its economy has also been in decline with 
mounting problems in respect of clove production and sales; a pattern which 
continued over 1984/85.
In 1983/84 clove exports fell to 900 tonnes, the lowest since 1978 and under a 
fifth of previous peak levels. In part this related to the major importer - 
Indonesia - suspending imports (a ban aparently lifted by early 1985) and in 
part to increased competition from Madagascar, the Comoros and Brazil. 1984 
reorganisation of the clove stem oil plant's procurement pattern to direct 
purchases from peasant growers was expected to restore a $ 1 to 1 . 5  million 
secondary export loss when the plant closed in early 1983 , but this is small
compared to the up to $3  ^ million earned from clove exports in past good 
years.
Production problems have centred on aging, disease and low producer prices
combined with few goods to buy. In mid-19 84 32Í price increases were
69introduced to restore incentives while in March 1984 and again in June 1985,
import liberisation and a greater role for private merchants was introduced in
70an attempt to improve goods availability.
Continuity And Change: After Mwalimu
There has been considerable debate on how Tanzania's economic policy may 
change when the United Republic's second president succeeds Mwalimu Nyerere.
The President himself has made clear he expects no change on basic issues1 ^ , a
72view which has been stated by Prime Minister Salim Salim as well.
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With an economic recovery in progress, little mass support for radical (and 
possible) changes, either to the right or left, and a high proportion of 
clearly competent senior economic ministers and managers, major short term 
economic strategy changes seem unlikely. Indeed a high continuity rate among 
senior personnel (including economic ministers) is not improbable. One 
exception is the most senior and long serving Economic Minister, A. H. Jamal, 
who is retiring. While Water, Energy and Mines Minister, A1 Noor Kassum, has 
said the same, his desire to remain in post to see the petroleum exploration 
and gas development programmes he has launched bear fruit may result in his 
staying. Governor Charles Nyirabu, after a dozen agonising years at the Bank 
of Tanzania, is likely to receive a well earned rest to recuperate from 
economic shell shock. Minister of Planning, Professor Kighoma Malima, is the 
least likely economic minister to be retained (just as Minister of Finance, 
Msuya, is the most likely). His rigid, academic approach to policy has since 
1982 led to growing erosion of his policy influence - especially with the 
Party - relative to that of the hard line pragmatists, Jamal and Msuya. 
Agriculture Ministry and parastatal changes are likely because of that set of 
institutions' nine years of continued bungling. 1984 and 1985 production 
recovery is credited more to weather and to general policy than to the 
Ministry, let alone most of its parastatals. However, no reversal of the 
strongly pro-rural bias held to by the Party since 1967 (for a variety of 
reasons both ideological and pragmatic) which has since 1977 raised average 
peasant consuming power from about 67? to over 133? of that of the minimum 
wage (by protecting the former against economic deterioration for better than 
the latter, e.g. by 180? grower price versus 120? minimum wage increases from 
late 1974 through late 1984) is at all likely.
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